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# No. 2 Man At State Is A Cooler-Downer

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By VICTOR S. NAVASKY

WASHINGTON.

**T**HE Under Secretary of State should be like the executive officer on a ship," former Secretary of State Dean Acheson told me in a recent telephone conversation. "He should run things. The Secretary is the captain. Every once in a while he should emerge from his cabin like Zeus and issue a few thunderbolts. That's the way George Marshall did it when he was Secretary [Acheson was then Under Secretary], and that's the way I did it when I was Secretary. Nobody's done it that way before or since."

Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, in office a little over a year, is the latest in a distinguished line of Under Secretaries who haven't run things. Predecessors under Dean

VICTOR S. NAVASKY, the editor of *Monocle*, is completing a book about the Attorney Generalship of Robert F. Kennedy.

Rusk include Chester Bowles, fired partly because he was right about the Bay of Pigs fiasco (and lived to tell the tale), and George Ball, who resigned partly because he believed he was right about the perils of escalation in Vietnam. Bowles tried unsuccessfully to engineer departmental ideology through a combination of imaginative ambassadorial appointments and enlightened memoranda, while Ball operated primarily as an *ad hoc* troubleshooter. Katzenbach has spent a year "getting a fix" on the department. His strategy has been to work within rather than counter to the bureaucracy, and he has recently revived a dormant but potentially powerful coordinating device, of which more later.

On Sept. 22, 1966, when President Johnson leaked word to the nation, in answer

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to a press conference query, that he had promoted Katzenbach out of the Cabinet to his new post, Washingtonians asked: Can a former Attorney General, the nation's No. 1 law officer, find happiness in Foggy Bottom, as alter ego to the President's most introverted Cabinet member, the Secretary of State? Six months later outside dopesters were asking a different question: "Whatever happened to Nick Katzenbach?"

In August of this year they found out. When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked the State Department for its views on Senator J. William Fulbright's resolution purporting to define Congressional responsibility in the making of foreign policy, Dean Rusk sent Under Secretary Katzenbach to the firing line. A former law professor (at the University of Chicago and Yale), he lectured the Senators on the history of federalism (lifting part of his text, without giving credit, from an article Senator Fulbright had written for the *Cornell Law Review* in 1961), conducted his own heated, accusatorial cross-examination of Committee Chairman Fulbright, and ended up alienating a number of erstwhile friends and supporters from the intellectual community, among them his summer neighbors on Martha's Vineyard.

**W**HEN Katzenbach arrived for his vacation in fog-bound Chilmark, he was greeted by a full-page ad in the *Vineyard Gazette*, signed by such lite-

rati as Lillian Hellman, Philip Roth, Jules Feiffer, John Hersey, William Styron, Robert Brustein and Robert Heilbroner. It expressed "shock" at his testimony, and "our outrage at your presumption that Congress, when it passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, intended to authorize the series of open-ended escalations that now bring our troop strength in Vietnam up to a half-million men and bombers within 10 miles of the border of China."

William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, who also summers on the Vineyard, suggests that the whole incident, including the lengthy letter exchange which followed, was "an emotional gesture by a group of people whose knowledge of the powers of the President wouldn't add up to that of a first-year law student. It gave them something to do on a rainy afternoon." While there is undoubtedly some truth to this meteorological explanation of the anti-Katzenbach outburst, the fact is that what seems to have upset dissident Democrats at least as far south as sunny Fire Island was less what he said than the fact that Nicholas deB. Katzenbach said it. He had violated vague expectations.

It sounded as though Katzenbach was maintaining that Congress intended — with the Tonkin Resolution — specifically to approve the bombing and escalation which followed. A close reading of the testimony reveals, however, that what he actually argued was merely that the President's

subsequent... authorized by the wording (as distinguished from the specific intent) of the resolution, and that Congress realized that this wording constituted a blank check whether or not they expected the President to cash it. The resolution authorizes the President "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed forces, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

IT is probably Washington's worst-kept secret that, starting in 1961, George Ball began sending confidential memoranda, first to President Kennedy then to President Johnson, advising against escalating United States involvement in Vietnam. Administration critics hoped that Katzenbach would carry on in George Ball's "devil's advocate" tradition, that he would tell it like it is. Instead, his testimony seemed to suggest, to quote the Gazette ad, that he was "playing the functionary." And it reinforced a growing negativism about his role. As the Washington correspondent of L'Express wrote not long ago: "... The choice of Nicholas Katzenbach as a replacement for Mr. Rusk's former No. 2 man, George Ball, is regarded in Washington as disastrous. Mr. Ball has made mistakes; but at least he has spoken up. Mr. Katzenbach transforms prudence into abstinence. . . ."

If the nation had any prior image of him, it was as courageous egghead, a committed civil-rights activist, an intellectual who put principle ahead of expediency, the public good before personal safety. There he was in the school-house door, his baldish head gleaming in the Tuscaloosa sun, confronting Gov. George Wallace and integrating the University of Alabama. There he was at Ole Miss, ducking bricks, glass, baseball bats and buckshot, directing the Federal effort to guarantee James Meredith's right to attend the previously all-white university. "In the midst of that chaos and desolation," recalls James Symington, then an aide at Justice, now Chief of Protocol at State, "he went

outside to give an interview to a Canadian television guy. He stood in the sunlight and gently, graciously and without imputation of evil designs to anybody, he described what was happening on TV in French. He had the *sang-froid* to do this. That's impressive."

Nicholas Katzenbach—twice-escaped World-War-II POW, Princeton graduate and Rhodes scholar, New Frontiersman and R.F.K.-protégé. It was his memorandum, overruling the official State Department position, which provided the legal basis for blockading Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis. No wonder that when Robert Kennedy withdrew from the Cabinet, he requested that President Johnson name Katzenbach the new Attorney General.

The fact is that Katzenbach's new image, as mindless defender or passive acceptor of a tarnished Vietnam policy, probably bears as little relation to his real role at State as his old image of integrationist freedom fighter did to his real role at Justice. His consistent contribution within the councils of Government, at both State and Justice, has been as a negotiator, a reconciler, a depolarizer, a common denominator-seeker, an interpreter, a cooler-downer, a word-drafter. "He thinks in Congressional terms," says William Macomber, State's lobbyist on Capitol Hill. "He's an enormous anchor to windward up there ['there' being the seventh floor, where State's top policymakers sit]." As a frequent Justice Department witness on Capitol Hill, Katzenbach had developed a keen sensitivity to the Congressional mentality. He has enjoyed easy and close relationships with such unlikely types as the late Senator Robert Kerr, perhaps the most powerful man in the Senate at the time, and Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen.

His appearance is deceptive. Like Peter Ustinov, whom he faintly resembles, he has a quick, self-deprecating wit and the distracted air of a bumbling, slightly absent-minded professor. His clothes are disorganized—unpressed custom-tailored suits, frayed shirts with elegant cufflinks and, be-

neath the dust shoes which look as though they were imported from Italy. He displays an aura of informality which helps camouflage a highly disciplined, sharply analytical, technically precise, lawyerlike mentality. "Anyone who has ever had the opportunity to take dictation from him says it's a joy," boasts Mrs. Helen Abdouch, his attractive, quiet-spoken secretary. "He never repeats. He never changes anything. He never has to put things on paper for himself. He doesn't have to take notes on conversations. He doesn't have anyone monitor his calls. And he would absolutely throw up if he read flowery things about himself."

Katzenbach's techniques of communicating vary. He can be disarming, as when he addressed a hostile National Association of Manufacturers audience on behalf of the East-West Trade bill and opened with "Mr. President and fellow students of the antitrust law. . . ." He can be aggressive, as he was at the Fulbright hearings. (An aide told me prior to the hearings, "When Nick is right he's calm, sweet and reasonable. When he has to argue something he really doesn't believe, he will be supercilious and score brilliant debater's points.") He can be as canny as any corporation lawyer. "You have to know what you can give away and what you can keep," says Katzenbach. "The secret is not to be

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stuck on words. Words are the best thing to give away. If anybody objects, you want to know why they object. The grounds of the objection are often much narrower than the provision itself. If you know why, you can draft around it."

**K**ATZENBACH is the government official primarily responsible for Congressional approval of the Consular Treaty with the Soviet Union, which provides for reciprocal diplomatic immunity. "Until Nick got here," says one State official, "the Secretary talked of the Consular Treaty as a bridge-building thing. Nick convinced him that that argument wouldn't work on the Hill. Instead, he got the Secretary to go up there and point out that the treaty gives American citizens rights in the U.S.S.R. that no Soviet citizen has, but it doesn't give the Soviets here what we don't already have."

His first flap at State resulted from an impulse to ease tensions. At the Defense Department's urging, he tried to reverse State's informal policy, instituted under G.

Mennen Williams, former Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, of not having port calls in South Africa. When civil-rights groups discovered that the U.S.S. Independence, an aircraft carrier returning from Vietnam, was scheduled to stop in apartheid-practicing Capetown, with shore leave a part of the bargain, they issued a violent protest, and the plan boomeranged. While the White House, State and Defense frantically tried to smooth things over, the captain of the ship, on his own, canceled all leave. Even Katzenbach's proposed compromise, that there would be leave in connection with integrated activities only, failed.

Today, Katzenbach still believes that canceling the leave weakened the position of liberal elements in South Africa, who had gone out of their way to plan integrated activities for the crewmen, but Paul Gorman, a Congressional aide who organized 45 Congressmen to protest the leave, says: "State was caught with its pants down. Katzenbach's mission was to contain the liberals. Guys said afterward he was like this about sending Federal registrars down South. He always had so-called liberal reasons for not doing the liberal thing. Only this time he failed."

with Governor Wallace was essentially an instance of his ability to avoid rather than precipitate a showdown. While cameras recorded Katzenbach's eyeball-to-eyeball charade with the Alabama Governor, the two Negro students (in accordance with Katzenbach's scenario) were quietly escorted to their dormitory rooms out of the range of popping flash bulbs. Later in the day they registered without difficulty. Thirty months thereafter, when he returned on Emancipation Day (Jan. 2, 1966) as Attorney General, he told his audience, "I thank you for the welcome."

It is a much warmer welcome than I experienced the last time I came to Alabama, as a visiting lecturer in constitutional law at the University of Alabama."

The consensus is that Katzenbach was a brilliant Deputy but not a particularly distinguished Attorney General. This is perhaps a harsh judgment because he had a tough act to follow, and he only had a 92-week run. However, in that period he was "a kind of super-Congressional relations man," to quote his close friend and former Justice associate, John Douglas. He helped draft and steer through

such legislation as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the first immigration reform bill in 40 years. Nevertheless, his civil liberties record was weak, his antitrust activity was timid, and under Katzenbach the department's offensive against organized crime, slowed down after President Kennedy's assassination, never regained its impetus. When President Johnson transferred him to the State Department the speculation—since subsidized—was that it was on-the-job training for Rusk's position. My own theory is that the President had come to believe that Katzenbach operates at optimal capacity as a No. 2, and there was not too much Katzenbach could do about it. The idea for the appointment came from George Ball, who says, "I tried to get Nick for State in 1961, but Justice got there first."

**C**OMPARING Katzenbach to his former boss, Robert Kennedy, one man who served them both at Justice, observed, "Robert tended to polarize an issue. He'd get everybody in a room, listen to the arguments on each side, decide which was right and then run like hell. Nick would always try to find a solution that would reconcile the different viewpoints." His contribution to the out-of-court settlement of the controversial General Aniline and Film case, which had been bogged down in the courts since the end of World War II, confirms this view.

When Kennedy and Katzenbach arrived at the Justice Department, no resolution of the case was in sight and the file on it included more than 240,000 documents, most in German script and on microfilm. In 1942 the Government had seized the assets of Interhandel, a Swiss holding company, arguing that it was really a cloak for I. G. Farben, the German chemical cartel. Suits and countersuits had gone all the way to the U. S. Supreme Court and back down again, and Congress annually entertained, but failed to pass, legislation which would have permitted the Government to dispose of the assets and put the proceeds in escrow until the dispute was resolved.

Once Kennedy arrived at the politically risky decision to settle, there still remained the matter of a formula to be worked out. The tough-minded Justice attorneys working on the case believed that it would be better to litigate than to settle for anything less than

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a two-to-one margin, especially for the United States. But Interhandel's people had instructions to settle for nothing less than a fifty-fifty split. Katzenbach's ingenious proposal, which both sides ultimately accepted, was that if Interhandel would agree to pay disputed Government tax claims from its share of the proceeds of the sale, Justice would agree to a fifty-fifty split. As a result, although the official settlement met Interhandel's technical demand, The Wall Street Journal reported that "Mr. Kennedy can contend that the division of dollars favors the U.S. by about two to one."

No. 2's can engage in such adroit maneuvers only when they have the complete confidence of No. 1's. As Deputy, Katzenbach enjoyed such a relationship with Attorney General Kennedy, whose general *modus operandi* involved maximum consultation, maximum delegation of authority and maximum White House support. Despite Dean Rusk's open-door policy where Katzenbach is concerned, and despite a mutual respect, such conditions simply do not obtain at State. The Secretary's *modus operandi* is like a blotter. He absorbs everything, is available when needed, and as crises spill over he does his best to maintain order. But after seven years in charge, and a lifetime's preparation, his expertise is unparalleled. It would be unnatural and inadvisable for him to place too much trust in a foreign-policy neophyte—regardless of rank, color or previous condition of servitude in the academy or the Cabinet. As George Ball observes, "Nick has the difficulty any new boy has when he comes in at mid-term. The President, Rusk and McNamara have been making decisions for years."

In addition, Rusk believes that his primary responsibility is to advise the President. "The Secretary keeps his own counsel to almost a unique degree for reasons of loyalty to the President," explains Benjamin Read, the Executive Secretary of the department, who occupies an office adjoining Rusk's, describes himself as "the official bottleneck" and daily feeds the same diet of information to

the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Read adds, "The Secretary feels it would be a disservice to the President if his views were known in advance." The department, presumably, will run itself.

To further complicate matters, the No. 3 man at State,

Eugene V. Rostow, former Yale Law Dean, appointed the same day as Katzenbach, is by nature more aggressive than either No. 1 or 2, and he has a brother (Walt W.) in the White House. Unlike Katzenbach, who scrupulously avoids initiating any contact with the President lest he be accused of trading on his former Cabinet status, the rambunctious Rostow has no compunctions about calling anyone, anywhere, any time. While he and Katzenbach are on good terms, there is bound to be some tension between a 54-year-old No. 3 and a 45-year-old No. 2 who studied and served as a professor under him.

**T**HEN, of course, there is the matter of the President. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower were content to ratify the prefabricated policies recommended by such strong Secretaries as Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles. President Kennedy, with the assistance of McGeorge Bundy's foreign-policy apparatus, preferred to run things from the White House. "But President Johnson likes to deal with people," laments a long-time Foreign Service officer. "It's not a question of his staff meddling. It's *him* meddling."

To recapitulate: The Under Secretary can't implement policy until he hears from the Secretary. The Secretary won't lay down policy until he can advise the President. The President won't accept advice until he talks with people like the Under Secretary. And the Under Secretary won't call him. Meanwhile, a 13-man Policy Planning Council down the hall [on the seventh floor] is turning out long-range policy papers which nobody has time to read, although, to use the current cliché, "policy-planning papers are a valuable in-put, but they have nothing to do with operations." Down on the sixth floor, where the Assistant Secretaries sit, hours are spent speculating which

member of the seventh-floor friendliest forum. And bureaucrats throughout the building go their separate ways without regard to anybody's policy, secure in the knowledge that they will outlast all the Secretaries and Under Secretaries.

Until a few months ago Katzenbach seemed content to operate within this Catch-22 system. This is partly because his style is that of the judicious lawyer, careful to research all alternatives before he stakes out a position. It is partly because of personnel problems. It is partly because his luggage from the Department of Justice included the unfinished report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (which he considers his major achievement as Attorney General). It is partly because shortly after his arrival he was named chairman of the three-man committee investigating the C.I.A.'s involvement with such extracurricular enterprises as the National Students Association. (The other members were John Gardner, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, described as "the doviest of doves," and Richard Helms, C.I.A. director, described as "the hawkiest of hawks." Katzenbach, with the drafting assistance of his since-departed aide, Jack Rosenthal, managed a unanimous report by avoiding condemnation of the C.I.A., while recommending that its system of subsidies be discontinued because of changed circumstances.) But mostly Katzenbach hasn't moved faster because, despite his status as an ex-Cabinet officer and his expertise as a former professor of international law, he has had so much to learn.

**O**NE of the things he had to learn had to do with the difference between State and Justice. Last spring the Under

Secretary, his wife Lydia (who startled diplomatic row when she announced that, as the new Under Secretary's wife, she didn't expect to attend any cocktail parties) and an entourage of senior aides were traveling through Africa when they received news that the Arab-Israeli situation was rapidly deteriorating. "If Ball had still been Under Secretary," speculates one observer, "he would have turned the plane around in midair and come home to run things." But Katzenbach flew on to the Sudan, while back at State, Gene Rostow set up a Middle East control group. "Nick is used to an orderly department," explains one colleague. "He was probably waiting for a phone call and it never came. This is the State Department, man. That's the loss of innocence."

In fairness it should be stated that, although the press put down his trip as "a whirlwind tour," J. Wayne Fredericks, a dedicated Africanist who served as deputy to G. Mennen Williams, says, "The trip had been postponed twice and a lot of Africans went to a lot of trouble preparing to receive him. As I saw it those three weeks added up to a lot. It was the first time in a long time that a top State official had focused so intensely on the problems of Africa. He didn't try to do everything but he saw dozens of African emperors, presidents and prime ministers. It meant a great deal to them and in my view it greatly added to the understanding of the African scene at the top levels of our Government."

Another lesson had to do with the difference between organizing the State Department and organizing our country's foreign policy. Everybody is always criticizing the State Department for not running the country's foreign policy, but the fact is that nobody really wants State to run things. Certainly not the Defense Department. Not the Walt Rostow operation at the White House. Not the C.I.A. Probably not Dean Rusk. Not even the local ambassadors who value their autonomy. (President Kennedy had enough trouble trying to get them to run things on a country-by-country basis.) What

critics like Arthur Schlesinger Jr. ask is that State be an instrumentally fully and promptly responsive to Presidential purpose." In other words, that somebody at State should run the State Department! But since every area of State Department activity infringes on some other agency's interests, and since the department's overseas personnel constitute only 10 per cent of all American overseas personnel (excluding the military) it soon becomes obvious that you can't run State without having something to say about

the entire foreign policy arena.

Katzenbach thought he had his foot in the door to this arena when he recruited a top Harvard economist and computer expert, Thomas C. Schelling, whose job it would be to introduce some ambitious interagency programming systems into the foreign-policy-making process. But Katzenbach and Schelling got no more cooperation than Secretary Rusk gets from the Fifth Avenue Committee to End the War in Vietnam. To the contrary, the project aborted, and Professor Schelling resigned before he officially assumed office.

**A** FEW months ago Katzenbach decided to try again—this time substituting for computers a more conventional bureaucratic device. He dusted off an old executive order, handed down in February, 1966, when George Ball was still Under Secretary. It provided for something called the Senior Interdepartmental Group, known popularly as the SIG. (It also provided for Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRGS), known colloquially as SIGLETS.) There is now a weekly SIG meeting at the Under Secretary's convenience. Members include the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the heads of AID, U.S.I.A. and C.I.A., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, White House representatives and oth-

ers as needed. Katzenbach is Executive Chairman. When one asks about the SIG around the department, there is a lot of rhetoric about how it can "catch issues which fall between stools," "anticipate long-term problems," "avoid rivalries and crossed wires," "eliminate trivial disagreements before they reach the White House," etc.

Officially the purpose of the SIG, which was originally recommended to President Johnson by Gen. Maxwell Taylor, is "to function as a focal point for decisions and actions on overseas interdepartmental matters. . . ." But the SIG's most interesting feature is that its chairman, in this case Katzenbach, makes the decisions (after advising and consulting with the members). And if one follows the organization chart, SIG decisions are appealable only to the White House. Students of bureaucratic infighting will immediately recognize the genius of a system which adheres on paper to the chain of command, vastly expands one's horizontal domain, yet permits one to by-pass one's immediate vertical superior.

The free-wheeling George Ball had no use for the SIG because he had no need for it. His style was to conquer the bureaucracy by ignoring it. By convening regular SIG meetings, Katzenbach, who prefers to work within conventional frameworks, may have come up with a device peculiarly suited to the personalities now in power, including his own.

Regardless of its success, however, the impact of the SIG on the overriding issue of Vietnam is moot since by most accounts Vietnam decisions are made by an informal war cabinet consisting of Rusk, Katzenbach, McNamara, Walt Rostow, Bundy and others. That is unless one buys the theory that real Vietnam policy is decided in telephone conversations between Johnson and Justice Abe Fortas—in between Supreme Court decisions—or Washington attorney Clark Clifford.

In either case it is a fact that Katzenbach has been in Vietnam operations, having traveled there twice. And one suspects that if the Administration's desire for negotiations ever escalates to the point of an extended bombing pause and/or a cease-fire, the SIG, with Katzenbach presiding, could advance some imaginative face-saving formulas as a basis for negotiations.

Now that hawks and doves have flown into the language it would be anticlimactic to conclude a discussion of the second-ranking fowl at State without a word about his feathers. First, of course, the obligatory squawk that such classifications don't do justice to the integrity and complexity of the men at the top, who generally approach issues on their merits, not on the basis of preconditioned war-peace reflexes. That said, Katzenbach seems to me to fly with that special species of dove, if he can be called that, represented by Secretary McNamara. He is by nature a civilian predisposed to distrust military solutions. Lydia Katzenbach says, "If Nick were allowed to talk about what he is doing, a lot of our friends would be heartened."

CAREFUL political ornithologists await Katzenbach's pronouncements on a variety of issues. Where, for instance, will he stand should the colonial claims of Portugal clash with the growing resistance movement in Mozambique? Or suppose the British, beset by economic crisis, end the sanctions against Rhodesia, and our black African friends in the U.N. balk? On the twin bases of his civil-rights background and his recent exposure to black Africa, perhaps he will prove a countervailing force to the traditional European bias of the department. What of his position on future policy toward the antiballistic missile? In the absence of an agreement with the Russians for limiting the number of nuclear warheads, Gene Rostow has been pushing for the United States to proceed with weapons development on an alliance basis. McNamara's Defense Department is said to favor a "parallel action" plan, anticipating eventual bilateral agreement with the Soviets.

But McNamara is out and Katzenbach has yet to pronounce himself. And where will he be next time mainland China's admission to the U.N. is raised?


In "The Political Foundations of International Law" which he co-authored with teaching colleague Morton Kaplan, he wrote: "Succession to state rights in terms of U.N. participation ought to be a matter for that organization to decide. . . . Two claimants contest China's seat on the Security Council. Neither claimant has a clear basis in fact for claiming to represent the territory or population of the state that signed the Charter. . . ." His recognition that international organizations have purposes different from national purposes suggests that maybe he will introduce a new realism to departmental deliberations on China policy.

Assuming that Katzenbach aligns himself with the so-called doves on these and other issues, will it make a difference? Not in the radical view. As one articulate New Left journalist remarked, "It is a cover to claim Katzenbach is the house dove or the house liberal or even the house intellectual. It's a myth that there's a good State Department which sends out Peace Corpsmen and gives aid and builds dams and hands out candy in the morning, and there's a bad State Department which drops napalm and overthrows governments. Guys like Katzenbach are appointed on the principle of the balanced ticket but they don't really make any difference. Liberal columnists bought the idea that Ball was fighting for peace and freedom while the bad guys were bombing Vietnam and invading the Dominican Republic. The truth is that the State Department is a disaster area. They ought to put up a sign, 'This property is condemned!'"

KATZENBACH may yet make a difference—but it will probably not be by direct policy confrontations. "I've never believed that there ought to be a devil's advocate around," he says. "What is important is always to bring out the other side. It's inexcusable not to articulate the possible, probable and inevitable consequences of the alternatives available to the President."

"Nicholas Katzenbach has one genius, and only one genius," remarked a prominent Washington attorney. "He knows how to handle Lyndon Johnson. Johnson is still telling the story of how he asked Katzenbach whether he wanted to be Attorney General or head of C.I.A. or what, and Nick said he'd be happy to be of service in any way he could. The fact that Nick would say that, and that the President would go around bragging about it and asking everybody else, 'Why can't you be like Nick Katzenbach?' tells you all you need to know about both men."


With all of George Ball's dissenting, America is fighting a land war in Southeast Asia. Who is to say that Katzenbach's method—whatever his convictions—is not the right one? He has no illusions about his power, but he doesn't underestimate the importance of his situation. "You could almost say," he says, "that everybody else is playing marbles. Without running down anybody else you're talking about survival. One mistake here can live on for years." ■



**DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL**—Katzenbach confronting Governor Wallace at the U. of Alabama, 1963—an instance of "his ability to avoid rather than precipitate a showdown."



**ATTORNEY GENERAL**—With Senator Robert Kennedy, whom he succeeded in 1965. "The consensus is he was a brilliant Deputy but not a particularly distinguished Attorney General."



**UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE**—Katzenbach appears before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with Dean Rusk in 1967. "His new image as mindless defender of a tarnished Vietnam policy probably bears as little relation to his real role at State as his old image of integrationist freedom fighter did to his real role at Justice. His consistent contribution has been as a negotiator, a depolarizer."